When the Shoe is on the Other Foot:
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities by Ackert, Lucy et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
6-1-2006 
When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: Experimental Evidence on 
Valuation Disparities 
Lucy Ackert 
Kennesaw State University 
Bryan Church 
Georgia Tech 
Gerald Dwyer 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Ackert, Lucy; Church, Bryan; and Dwyer, Gerald, "When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: Experimental 
Evidence on Valuation Disparities" (2006). ExCEN Working Papers. 151. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/151 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
 
 
When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: 
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities 
 
 
 
Lucy F. Ackert 
Kennesaw State University 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
 
 
Bryan K. Church 
College of Management 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Gerald P. Dwyer  
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2006 
 
 
 
When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: 
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities 
 
Abstract 
 
The method of elicitation has an important effect on valuations.  We investigate the effect 
of perspective on decision makers’ elicited values.  We conduct experimental sessions in 
which participants act as sellers or buyers and replicate the disparity between willingness 
to accept and willingness to pay: sellers want to collect more and buyers want to pay less.  
We conduct additional sessions in which endowed decision makers provide values that 
are used to determine a price at which anonymous others transact.  In these sessions, 
decision makers’ experimental earnings are not affected by valuations, but rather 
determined by their endowment.  Decision makers appear to consider their standing 
relative to anonymous others in providing valuations, i.e., decision makers’ endowments 
affect their valuations.  The results indicate that the disparity between willingness to 
accept and willingness to pay disappears when decision makers’ endowment ensures that 
they are at least as well off as anonymous others. 
 
Keywords: willingness to accept, willingness to pay, valuation disparity, perspective 
taking, mediation 
 
JEL: C91, C92 
 
When the Shoe is on the Other Foot: 
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mediation is often used to settle disagreements, including environmental 
conflicts, civil unrest, labor-management disputes, and divorce cases.  The practice is 
commonly embraced as a low cost means to resolve disputes.  But for mediation to be 
successful,  the parties need to recognize one another’s perspective (e.g., Korobkin 2006).  
Understanding the valuation of adversaries can be critical to avoid impasse and achieve 
settlement.  Prior findings indicate that an individual’s ability to take the perspective of 
another, and thereby consider another’s valuation more objectively, can have a marked 
effect on conflict resolution (e.g., Neale and Bazerman 1983; Thompson and Hastie 
1990; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001).  Successful mediators may be particularly adept at 
taking the perspective of others. 
Previous studies suggest that an individual’s perspective or role underlies 
valuation disparities (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden 1986; Van Boven, Dunning, 
and Loewenstein 2000; Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning, 2003).  Individuals 
provide far different valuations when put in the role of a seller versus a buyer.  In an 
extensive review of the literature, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) estimate that the 
minimum compensation necessary to relinquish a good (i.e., willingness to accept or 
WTA) is approximately seven times higher than the maximum amount paid to acquire the 
good (i.e., willingness to pay or WTP).1  The assigned role effectively creates a 
perspective from which valuations are based: sellers want to collect more and buyers 
want to pay less. 
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Individuals have difficulty setting aside their perspective and fully 
comprehending another’s point of view.  As the old adage goes, it is difficult to walk in 
someone else’s shoes.  Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) conduct 
experiments in which mug owners estimate buyers’ average purchase price and mug 
buyers estimate owners’ average selling price.  They find that owners overestimate 
buyers’ average purchase price and buyers underestimate owners’ selling price.   
Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden (1986) examine the assessments of individuals 
acting on behalf of others.  In their experiments, an advisor evaluates whether another 
should pay a fixed amount for a lottery ticket (WTP) or accept a fixed sum (WTA).  The 
results indicate that advisors’ decisions differ significantly from those of participants who 
answer on their own behalf.  When advisors make decisions, there is no evidence of a gap 
between WTP and WTA.  However, the study does not elicit values, but rather focuses on 
decisions about buying or selling entitlements.  Our experiment differs from Marshall, 
Knetsch, and Sinden’s in that we use an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism and 
vary the endowment of the decision maker.  Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden’s advisors 
were not compensated. 
In another study, Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning (2003) have participants 
act as buyers’ agents, with earnings contingent on their ability to estimate owner’s selling 
prices.  The study’s findings indicate that agents’ offers are too low: buyers’ agents 
underestimate the owner’s selling price.  Once again, it is difficult to fully comprehend 
another’s perspective. 
We experimentally investigate the effect of perspective on individuals’ valuations 
and whether participants provide objective valuations for others.  Initially we conduct 
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sessions in which participants (decision makers) give valuations on their own behalf.  We 
replicate earlier findings and document a sizable disparity between WTA and WTP: 
participants require more to relinquish a good than they offer to acquire it.  In subsequent 
sessions, decision makers provide valuations on behalf of others (adherents).  Our results 
suggest that decision makers’ wealth relative to that of adherents affects the elicited 
values.  When decision makers are at least as well off as adherents – in terms of 
experimental earnings – they are able to provide objective valuations.  Under such 
conditions, we do not find a significant difference between valuations under WTA and 
WTP. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The experimental design, 
discussed subsequently, is summarized in Table 1.  Sections 2, 3, and 4 detail the 
experimental method and results for each treatment.  Section 5 contains a discussion of 
the findings, along with concluding remarks and implications for dispute resolution. 
 
2. The Base Treatment 
We conduct six sessions in the base treatment and each session includes eight 
participants, giving a total of 48 participants.  Each session consists of a series of ten 
trials and requires approximately 30 minutes.  Participants’ are students at a medium-
sized university located in the Southeastern U.S. and all are inexperienced in that no one 
took part in more than one session.2  At the beginning of each session, participants 
receive a set of instructions and follow along as an experimenter reads aloud.3   
 
2.1 Experimental Procedures 
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In the first treatment we attempt to replicate the reported disparity between WTP 
and WTA to provide a basis of comparison.  We measure first willingness to accept in 
sessions 1-3, referred to as the Base/WTA sessions.  Student participants are given $10 in 
cash and a coffee mug bearing the university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for 
$7.00.4  The written instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in the experiment just received $10 in cash and a mug.  
These are yours to keep.  During the experiment you will submit offers 
indicating the amount of money you will accept in exchange for the mug.  
We will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.”   
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your 
offer facing down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter 
will circulate around the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your 
offer, you cannot revise it and you may be required to exchange your mug 
for cash. 
 
The instructions then describe the Vickrey (1961) auction used to elicit WTA with 
repeated participation as follows:5 
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the 
experimenters will collect the cards.  We will rank all participants’ offers 
from highest to lowest.  Those with the four lowest offers may be required 
to exchange their mug with the experimenters at the fifth lowest offer.  If 
you are required to exchange your mug for money, you will always 
receive at least your offer.  Any ties in offers will be resolved randomly. 
 
We will repeat these steps 10 times.  At the end of each trial, the offer 
price at which transactions may occur is announced (i.e., the fifth lowest 
offer).  However, only one of the ten trials will be binding.  A number 
from one to ten will be randomly selected to determine the binding trial. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 
You now own the mug and $10 in your possession.  Please indicate the 
amount that you are willing to accept in exchange for the mug. 
 
As the instructions indicate, participants are told at the outset that they will be paid based 
on the results of only one of the trials, and this trial is chosen by a card draw.  Because ex 
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ante the students have no way of knowing which trial is the payout trial it is in their 
interest to treat all trials equally seriously. 
 Sessions 4-6 are conducted similarly except that participants are endowed with 
$20 and asked to indicate the amount they are willing to pay to acquire a mug 
(Base/WTP).  The instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in the experiment just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to 
keep.  The experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs.  You are free to 
examine the mugs.  During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the 
amount of money you would pay in exchange for a mug.  We will refer to this 
amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
The instructions continue and describe the Vickrey auction as follows: 
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the 
experimenters will collect the cards.  We will rank all participants’ offers from 
highest to lowest.  Those with the four highest offers may be required to exchange 
cash for a mug with the experimenters at the fifth highest offer.  Thus, if you are 
required to exchange money for a mug, you will never pay more than your offer.  
Any ties in offers will be resolved randomly. 
 
Again the procedures are repeated over ten trials and one randomly selected trial 
determines the binding outcome. 
 
2.2 The Results 
Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction.  Panel A 
reports the average price and median offer across trials and sessions for the Base 
treatment.  The price in the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer.  The 
table reports the average WTA and WTP for all 10 trials, as well as trials 1-5 and 6-10 for 
each treatment.  Below the value measurements are z-statistics and corresponding p-
values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the null hypothesis that WTA and WTP do 
not differ.6 
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For the Base treatment, WTA exceeds WTP for prices and offers, at high 
significance levels (p < 0.0001).  Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all 
trials, trials 1-5, or trials 6-10.  We also estimate a repeated-measures ANOVA to 
compare prices across sessions and find that method of elicitation (WTP versus WTA) is 
statistically significant (F1,4 = 7.71, p = 0.05).7  Inferences are unaffected when the 
repeated-measures ANOVA uses participants’ offers as the dependent measure (F1,46 = 
20.61, p < 0.001). 
To provide additional insight, we include a histogram of participants’ offers.  For 
each participant, we compute the median offer over trials 1-10.  Figure 1 depicts the 
frequency of offers for WTA and WTP sessions, partitioned into five groups.  The data 
provide further evidence of valuation disparities, arising in participants’ offers.  That is, 
participants in the WTA sessions provide markedly higher offers than those in the WTP 
sessions.8 
 
3. THE DECISION MAKER TREATMENT: MUG ENDOWMENT 
 The results of our Base treatment are consistent with the widely reported disparity 
between WTP and WTA.  As argued by others (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden 
1986; Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000, 2003), perspective or role is 
important to the elicited valuation.  In the second treatment, we ask decision makers 
(DMs) to provide valuations for others.  Unlike Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning 
(2003), the DMs’ elicited values do not affect their final wealth: they are endowed at the 
beginning of a session and the endowment is theirs to keep, representing experimental 
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earnings.  The DMs are endowed with a mug and $10, which they take from the 
experiment as their compensation.  We refer to this as the DM/Mug treatment. 
 
3.1 Experimental Procedures 
 In sessions 7-12 we again elicit measures of WTA and WTP.  The process differs, 
however, in that participants (the DMs) are asked to indicate valuations for other students 
(the adherents).  Twelve inexperienced students are recruited for each session and 
randomly divided into groups of eight and four.  With six sessions, a total of 72 students 
participate in this treatment.  The two groups meet in separate rooms and do not see each 
other until the conclusion of the experimental session.   
In sessions 7-9, all twelve participants are given $10 in cash and a coffee mug 
bearing the university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for $7.00 (DM/Mug/WTA).  
The endowment is common knowledge to all twelve participants.  In these sessions, the 
DMs provide values that determine a price at which the adherents will sell their mug.  
The group of eight DMs is directed as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug.  In 
addition, four participants in another room also have received $10 in cash 
and a mug.   
 
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of 
money that participants in the other room will accept in exchange for their 
mug.  We will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your 
offer facing down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter 
will circulate around the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your 
offer, you cannot revise it, and it may represent the amount that 
participants in the other room are required to exchange their mugs for 
cash. 
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As in the Base/WTA treatment (sessions 1-3), the instructions then describe the Vickrey 
auction: the fifth lowest offer determines the market valuation.  But in this case, the 
market valuation is the amount that others may be required to accept in exchange for their 
mugs.  Again, one of the 10 trials is randomly selected as the binding trial and the fifth 
lowest offer determines the market valuation.  The instructions continue as follows: 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other room will be 
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.  
Participants from the other room will then exchange their mugs for cash. 
 
Sessions 10-12 are similar in that the eight DMs are endowed with a mug and 
$10.  Unlike sessions 7-9, the four adherents are endowed with $20.  The eight randomly 
selected DMs indicate the amount that participants in the other room should pay to 
acquire a mug (DM/Mug/WTP).  The eight DMs are instructed as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug.  These 
are yours to keep.  In addition, four participants in another room have 
received $20 in cash.  Participants in the other room will exchange cash 
for a mug with the experimenters at an amount determined by you.  The 
mug they will receive is identical to the mug you received. 
 
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of 
money that participants in the other room will pay to acquire a mug.  We 
will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.” 
 
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.  
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your 
offer facing down and your participant number on top).  An experimenter 
will circulate around the room to collect the cards.  Once you record your 
offer, you cannot revise it, and it may represent the amount of cash that 
participants in the other room are required to exchange for a mug. 
 
The instructions then describe the Vickrey auction with repeated participation.  
The procedures are repeated ten times.  The instructions end with the following: 
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other room will be 
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.  
Participants from the other room will then exchange cash for a mug. 
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The four adherents in the other room are informed that they are bound by the 
DMs’ offers. 
 
3.2 The Results 
Panel B of Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction 
for the DM/Mug treatment.  The table reports the average WTA and WTP for all 10 
trials, as well as trials 1-5 and 6-10 for each treatment.  Below the value measurements 
are z-statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the null 
hypothesis that WTA and WTP do not differ.   
Unlike the Base treatment, for the DM/Mug treatment, the relationship between 
WTP and WTA is reversed and WTP exceeds WTA, again at high levels of significance 
(p < 0.0001).  Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all trials, trials 1-5, or 
trials 6-10.   A repeated-measures ANOVA comparing prices across WTA and WTP 
sessions indicates that the method of elicitation is statistically significant (F1,4  = 23.02, p 
= 0.009).  In contrast to the often-reported finding that WTA exceeds WTP, valuations of 
the DMs in our second treatment lead to a significantly higher purchase price than selling 
price for adherents. 
As before, we present a histogram of participants’ offers.  Figure 2 depicts the 
frequency of offers under WTA and WTP partitioned into five groups.  The effect of 
elicitation method appears to be very pronounced.  The median offer of every WTA 
participant is less than $6.  By comparison, the median offer of the vast majority of WTP 
participants (22 of 24) exceeds $6.  We also perform a repeated-measures ANOVA using 
participants’ offers per trial as the dependent measure and find that method of elicitation 
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is statistically significant at p < 0.001 (F1,46 = 82.53).  Thus, the results are even stronger 
using participants’ offers as the dependent measure.   
 
4. THE DECISION MAKER TREATMENT: CASH ENDOWMENT 
 When decision makers are endowed with a mug and $10 in cash, the results are 
puzzling.  With WTP higher than WTA, the DMs’ valuations are quite different than 
those of individuals providing valuations for themselves.  After reflecting, we wondered 
if the DMs’ endowment affected their valuations.9  Because cash is fungible and a natural 
referent, we conducted six additional sessions in which the DMs were endowed with $20.  
When DMs are only endowed with cash, they are at least as well off as the adherents – in 
terms of what is taken away from the experiment.  Under such conditions, they may be 
able to provide objective valuations.  We refer to this as the DM/Cash treatment. 
 
4.1 Experimental Procedures 
We conduct six sessions in the DM/Cash treatment (sessions 13-18) in which we 
elicit measures of WTA and WTP using valuations for other students.  As in the 
DM/Mug treatment, a total of 72 students participated.  The procedures differ from the 
second treatment in that the DMs are all endowed with $20.  For WTA (sessions 13-15), 
the four adherents are each given $10 in cash and a coffee mug.  The DMs indicate the 
amount that participants in the other room should accept in exchange for their mugs 
(DM/Cash/WTA).  The instructions are as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to 
keep.  In addition, four participants in another room have received $10 in cash and 
a mug.  The experimenter has an identical mug in her/his possession.  You are 
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free to examine the mug.  Participants in the other room will exchange their mugs 
with the experimenters at an amount determined by you. 
 
The instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTA sessions). 
For WTP (sessions 16-18), the procedures are similar except that the four 
adherents are endowed with $20 (as are the eight DMs).  The DMs indicate the amount 
that participants in the other room should pay to acquire a mug (DM/Cash/WTP).  The 
instructions begin as follows: 
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash.  This cash is yours to 
keep.  In addition, four participants in another room also have received $20 in 
cash.  The experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs.  You are free to 
examine the mugs.  Participants in the other room will exchange cash for a mug 
with the experimenters at an amount determined by you. 
 
Again, the instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTP sessions). 
 
4.2 The Results 
Panel C of Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP for the final treatment 
(DM/Cash), in which DMs are endowed only with cash.  Unlike the first two treatments, 
the valuation gap disappears.  Inferences are unchanged if tests use prices or offers for all 
trials, trials 1-5, or trials 6-10. Also unlike the first two treatments, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA comparing prices across WTA and WTP sessions indicates that the method of 
elicitation is not statistically significant (F1,4  = 0.01, p = 0.935).  Inferences are similar 
using participants’ offers as the dependent measure (F1,46  = 0.86, p = 0.359).   
Figure 3 presents a histogram of participants’ offers.  An inspection indicates that 
the distribution of participants’ median offers is very similar under WTA and WTP.  
Therefore, the data indicate that the valuation disparity between WTA and WTP is 
eliminated in the DM/Cash sessions.    
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The literature has documented the impact of elicitation method on individuals’ 
valuations.  This paper demonstrates the importance of perspective.  Commonly, WTA is 
elicited by putting the experimental participant in the role of the seller and WTP by 
putting the participant in the role of buyer.  In our experiment, we first replicate the often-
reported result that sellers demand more to surrender a good than buyers are willing to 
pay to acquire the same good (Base treatment).  Next we ask participants to act as 
decision makers (DMs) who provide valuations for others, referred to as the adherents 
(DM/Mug treatment).  We endow the DMs with a mug and $10 in cash.  We now observe 
that the relationship between WTA and WTP is reversed.  The DMs’ valuations are 
significantly higher when the adherent purchases the mug than when the adherent sells 
the mug.  The striking change in the gap between WTA and WTP in the DM/Mug 
treatment calls for further investigation. 
Models of economic behavior recognize that some people care about fairness 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) and equity is an important factor in bargaining games (Davis and Holt 1993).  
Fairness can be modeled as an aversion to inequity, measured in relative terms.  
Individuals are self-centered and care about relative standing.  While the identification of 
the reference group may not be simple, in an experiment the reference group is the set of 
participants (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).   
In our experiment, it appears that a DM who cares about relative standing does 
not want to be worse off than the adherent.  The effect of the DM’s perspective contrasts 
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sharply with a seller who wants to collect more or a buyer who wants to pay less.  The 
behavior of the DMs in the DM/Mug treatment is consistent with recent economic 
models of behavior, which predict that relative standing matters.  Recall that in the 
DM/Cash treatment, DMs are endowed with cash and they are at least as well off as the 
adherents.  In contrast, in the DM/Mug treatment, WTP may exceed WTA because the 
DMs are comparing their standing relative to the adherents.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
provide a model of inequity aversion in which people care about their material payoff 
relative to the payoffs of others.  In addition, relative standing motivates people’s 
behavior in Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) model.   
In our experimental setting, the WTP valuation may be high because the DMs 
perceive their relative standing to be below that of the mug buyers if the mug buyers pay 
a low price for the mug.  In the WTP treatment, if the adherents pay, on average, $8.55 
for a mug (refer to Panel B of Table 2), they leave the experiment with a mug and, on 
average, $11.45.  On the other hand, if the adherents acquire a mug for a low price, they 
leave the experiment with relatively more than the DMs who have a mug and $10.   
In the DM/Cash treatment, DMs may be more objective because they end up in a 
better position than the adherents, assuming cash is preferred.  Interestingly, WTA and 
WTP are quite close to the actual purchase price of the mugs ($7), an amount that was 
never disclosed to the participants.  Because cash is fungible and its value is clear, it is a 
natural referent.  With an endowment of $20, relative standing is of less concern to the 
DMs and they can focus on the decision to be made. 
Our results are consistent with DMs being inequity-averse when their relative 
standing is inferior to that of others.  By comparison, DMs do not appear to be concerned 
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about their standing when they are better off relative to others.  In other words, our data 
are consistent with preferences being one sided.  Individuals do not like differences in 
outcomes, at least when they are not doing as well as others. The implication for conflict 
resolution is that relative standing can influence perspective-taking ability.  Mediators 
need to realize that relative standing is an important factor that can influence dispute 
resolution.  
 This paper documents the important effect of perspective and relative standing on 
the elicitation of value.  Although the disparity between WTA andWTP disappears when 
DMs are endowed with cash and asked to provide valuations for others, we cannot 
conclude that third party decisions, including those of mediators, are superior.  Because 
DMs evaluate the effects of a change in position so differently depending on their own 
position, they do not necessarily make welfare enhancing decisions for others.  Future 
research may provide insight into how mediators can better take the perspective of others. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
* The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System.  The authors gratefully 
acknowledge the financial support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and the helpful 
comments of Paul Ferraro, Ann Gillette, and Mark Rider. 
                                                 
1 In a recent study, Plott and Zeiller (2005) find that when an incentive compatible 
elicitation mechanism is used and participants receive training and are paid for practice 
with anonymity, WTA is not significantly higher than WTP.  But, the procedural choices 
used in Plott and Zeiller effectively strip away strategic considerations, thereby 
suppressing the effect of perspective or role.    
2 This holds for all sessions (i.e., across all experimental treatments). 
3 The complete instructions are available upon request. 
4 The fact that the mug can be purchased at the bookstore for $7.00 is not disclosed to 
participants at any time.   
5 Plott and Zeiller (2005) argue that the elicitation mechanism proposed by Becker, 
DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) is the most incentive compatible, with the Vickrey 
auction as the next best, in theory.  Our design also differs along other dimensions from 
Plott and Zieler (2005).  For example, in each session they include two unpaid training 
rounds, 14 rounds in which a lottery is valued, and one round in which a mug is valued. 
6 Inferences are unchanged with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for all Mann-Whitney tests 
reported here and subsequently in this paper. 
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7 Period and the interaction of period and method of elicitation are not significant in any 
of the repeated measures ANOVAs (p > 0.10) reported in the paper.  In determining 
statistical significance, the degrees of freedom for within-subject effects are adjusted 
using the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure.  The adjustment is necessary because, in each 
case, Mauchly's test of sphericity is rejected at p < 0.01. 
8 Price censoring does not explain the results we report in this paper.  In an experiment 
that elicits value, problems can arise if participants rationally believe the good can be 
purchased at lower prices outside of the laboratory (Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstrom 
2004).  In our post-experiment questionnaire we asked participants how much they 
thought the experimenters paid for the mug.  Although price censoring is potentially a 
significant methodological problem, we have no evidence to suggest that it affected our 
results.  There is no consistent pattern in reported costs to the experimenters across 
treatments.     
9 Future research might examine the impact of perspective and earned income on 
valuations.  Research shows that notions of fairness change when subjects earn their 
position in the payoff distribution, rather than being endowed by the experimenter.  For 
example, in a dictator game Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) find that dictators are 
more self-interested when they bargain over income that is earned.   
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 Table 1 
Experimental Design 
 
This table summarizes the experimental design.  All sessions include 10 trials. 
 
Treatment Measure of Value Sessions 
Total 
Number of 
Participants
Per Session 
Endowment 
(8 participants) 
WTA 1-3 8 Mug + $10 
Base 
WTP 4-6 8 $20 
Treatment Measure of Value Sessions 
Total 
Number of 
Participants
Per Session 
DM’s 
Endowment 
(8 participants) 
Adherent’s 
Endowment 
(4 participants) 
WTA 7-9 12 Mug + $10 Mug + $10 
DM/Mug 
WTP 10-12 12 Mug + $10 $20 
WTA 13-15 12 $20 Mug + $10 
DM/Cash 
WTP 16-18 12 $20 $20  
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Table 2 
Prices and Offers 
 
The table reports the average price and median offer across trials and sessions in each treatment.  In the 
WTA sessions participants are asked to submit offers indicating the amount of money that should be 
accepted in exchange for a mug and in the WTP sessions participants are asked to indicate the amount that 
should be paid to acquire a mug.  The price in the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer.  
Each session includes 10 trials.  The table also reports the average WTA and WTP in trials 1-5 and 6-10 for 
each treatment.  Below the value measurements are z-statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of 
Mann-Whitney tests of the hypothesis that WTA and WTP are equal.  Panels A, B, and C, report prices and 
offers for the Base, DM/Mug, and DM/Cash treatments, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Base Treatment 
All Trials Trials 1-5 Trials 6-10 Measure WTA  WTP WTA  WTP WTA  WTP 
8.83 1.34 9.04 1.51 8.61 1.18 
Prices -6.67 
(0.000) 
-4.69 
(0.000) 
-4.69 
(0.000) 
10.09 1.64 10.74 1.89 9.03 1.53 
Offers -5.31 
(0.000) 
-5.25 
(0.000) 
-4.83 
(0.000) 
Panel B: DM/Mug Treatment 
All Trials Trials 1-5 Trials 6-10 Measure WTA  WTP WTA  WTP WTA  WTP 
3.79 8.55 4.00 8.00 3.57 9.10 
Prices -6.70 
(0.000) 
-4.67 
(0.000) 
-4.72 
(0.000) 
3.71 8.91 3.94 8.31 3.63 9.24 
Offers -5.88 
(0.000) 
-5.50 
(0.000) 
-5.29 
(0.000) 
Panel C: DM/CashTreatment 
All Trials Trials 1-5 Trials 6-10 Measure WTA  WTP WTA  WTP WTA  WTP 
6.99 6.92 7.06 6.45 6.92 7.38 
Prices -0.55 
(0.582) 
-1.54 
(0.126) 
-0.80 
(0.424) 
7.53 6.72 6.73 6.74 8.26 6.89 
Offers -0.86 
(0.391) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
-1.31 
(0.189) 
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Figure 1: Frequency of Decision Makers' 
Median Offer in the Base Treatment
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Figure 2: Frequency of Decision Makers' 
Median Offer in the DM/Mug Treatment
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Figure 3: Frequency of Decision Makers' 
Median Offer in the DM/Cash Treatment
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